Most bankruptcy procedures try to reorganize a financially-distressed firm's debts to a serviceable level through negotiations overseen by courts. Markets are an alternative to such negotiations. This paper develops a market-based approach that is appropriate if claimants are severely cash-constrained and there is merit in having existing owners-managers remain in control.
Introduction
The goal of any bankruptcy procedure is the efficient deployment of the financially-distressed firm's assets. It seeks to distinguish viable from nonviable firms, and to reorganize the liabilities of viable firms and liquidate the others in an orderly manner. In doing so, an attempt is made to protect existing creditor rights, but the incentive for one creditor to free-ride on others suggests the need for some element of coercion. Hence the common practice of courts to over-rule some creditors if a sufficient majority agree on a reorganization plan.
Bankruptcy procedures differ across countries for many historical reasons; and the extent to which courts get involved also differ. In some countries, courts allow creditors to take possession of the firm sooner than in others; but it is easy to exaggerate such international differences because debtors and creditors often negotiate long before they involve the courts.
Bankruptcy procedures should be adequate to deal with the normal mortality of firms, and will always be inadequate in a systemic financial crisis. When most firms in an economy cannot service their debts, different procedures are needed, and this paper proposes one that is especially well-suited to resolve bankruptcies following the 1997 Asian Crisis. It has wider applicability, but we begin by describing the problem of corporate indebtedness in East Asia, and how the proposed scheme could be utilized. Section 1.1 outlines East Asia's current problem of corporate indebtedness, and section 1.2 outlines market based bankruptcy schemes in the literature. None of them are directly applicable for reasons that are described in section 1.3. The proposed scheme is then outlined and analyzed in section 2. Section 3 extends the analysis to allow for an initial seniority structure of the debt, creditors with heterogeneous beliefs about the value of the firm, and the government as a creditor. Concluding remarks and issues for implementation appear in section 4.
East Asia's Systemic & Lingering Problems
East Asian firms, which were considered well-run before the crisis broke, tend to exhibit three characteristics. First, they are generally family owned and managed. Even very large firms that are listed on stock exchanges are generally controlled by a dynastic-type of owner. With control being exercised despite a minority holding and a corporate structure that is often complex with cascading and inter-locking equity ownership, finances tend to be non-transparent (see Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000) .
Second, firms borrowed heavily. This was both because outside equity had the potential to threaten insider control and because banks were so willing to lend. The large savings of Asia were channeled through banks, many that were controlled by major industrial groups.
Third, many of these debts were denominated in foreign currency even when the borrower was not exporting. In part, this was the result of countries having fixed exchange rate regimes that lulled participants about the risks they were incurring, and in part distortions that prompted banks to lend through off-shore entities.
The East Asian crisis wreaked havoc on firms. Not only were the markets for their products and inputs disrupted by the major change in the exchange rates, but their debts mushroomed in local currency terms.
1,2 The first required major changes in operations: some products were no longer profitable to produce, and markets had to be found for others at a time when even trade financing had dried up. Still, firms coped by suspending debt service payments and conserving cash to pay suppliers and workers rather than creditors. But in the aggregate, firms' operating cash surpluses are insufficient to service their debts (see Claessens, Djankov, and Klingebiel, 1999) Lenders (mostly banks, for there was little commercial paper or bonds) initially extended new loans so borrowers could repay old loans and lenders could avoid having to mark the loans as bad debts. But with market interest rates much higher 3 and banking supervisors cracking down on this practice, such "new" loans were also drying up. The borrowers therefore simply stopped servicing their debts while creditors scrambled for information about the internecine inter-subsidiary transactions and other holdings of their borrowers.
These broad developments are common to all the East Asian countries, but the extent and severity of their situations vary. Indonesia suffered the greatest output decline; 4 but the debt to equity ratios seem largest in Korea (accounting differences make cross-country comparisons difficult). Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 portray these developments.
5
Governments in all the crisis countries responded by intervening in the banking system. Depositors were protected in an effort to stem banking panics and runs; but this essentially transferred all loan losses onto taxpayers. Banking supervisors began enforcing loan classification requirements and insisted on adequate provisioning against bad loans. This wiped out the banks' own equity, and when they failed to meet the capital adequacy and other requirements, the authorities took over the banks. Again, while this was common to all the crisis countries, the details and the timing differed. In Thailand, finance companies were taken over and liquidated; but the authorities avoided taking over the banks, preferring a scheme that gave bank owners time to find additional equity.
The details of how each country intervened in the banks are long and colorful. The relevant point, though, is that by protecting depositors against losses, each country's government has essentially become the major creditor of firms; perhaps not directly but through the various entities (intervened banks in some countries, work out units or Asset Management Companies in others) where it has parked these claims.
All the crisis countries have also rewritten their bankruptcy laws and procedures; but even so, they are hardly being used. Few bankruptcy claims have been filed (e.g., in Indonesia, despite its spanking new bankruptcy laws, only 183 bankruptcy petitions were filed from August 1998 to August 2000) and little progress has been made on renegotiations.
6 Nevertheless, firms have been restructuring their operations and, for the most part, they have posted positive cash flows (Xu, 2000) , both of which point to the competence of firms' managers.
Although the debts are not being fully serviced, their continuation erodes the incentives that a firm's owner faces. Profits and improvements in firm value accrue to the creditor so long as there is a debt overhang. Put differently, the owners' call options are now far "out of the money" because the exercise price far exceeds the asset value of the firm. Having both the incentive and the means (for managers are closely linked to the controlling owners), it is very likely that assets are stripped from the firm over time (and there are a variety of ways this could be done) leaving the creditors with a claim over an empty shell. And the main creditor is the government which protected banking deposits; so the failure to address the issue could wreak havoc anew in the countries.
The Need for a Different Scheme
Conventional bankruptcy cannot work in a situation like this for three reasons. First, the scale far exceeds the capabilities of even experienced courts, and as the concepts and procedures are unfamiliar, appeals and procedural disputes abound. While courts should and will become better, one cannot rely on them if one seeks a quick resolution.
Second, a firm's finances are opaque. While those closely connected with the firm (e.g. some creditors, suppliers etc.) may have some idea of the value of the firm, procedures that rely on accounting (as courts inevitably must) are bound to fail. Again, while accounting must and will improve, this will take far longer than the corporate overhang should be permitted.
Third, the threat of creditors taking over the firm is not credible. With most managers connected to owners, there are simply no managers that creditors could hire to operate the firm.
So what is needed is a way for the debts to be reduced to sustainable levels without displacing existing management, which, given the close links between managers and controlling owners, means without the owners' loss of control. Market-based alternatives are attractive because they make fewer demands on the court and can be structured to minimize the politicization of the restructuring that may occur when the government is a major creditor.
Auctions have been used, even in the region, to sell a firm as a going concern or a firm's assets in a liquidation. For example, Thailand's Financial Restructuring Agency auctioned the bad loans of the finance companies it had taken over. This was a liquidation of assets (that happened to be loans). Thorburn's (2000) study of auctions of small bankrupt firms in Sweden finds them to be efficient, quick, requiring low costs, and avoiding the deviations from absolute priority that cash sales allow. She also finds that 74 percent of firms continue as going concerns, which is similar to Chapter 11 outcomes. Stromberg (2000) noted that both bankruptcy auctions and reorganization negotiations avoid fire-sale liquidations but could also result in needless delays because of conflicts between banks and other creditors. He observed that junior creditors fare better in negotiations than through auctions because of hold-out threats.
Market-based schemes for bankruptcy reorganization have also been proposed in the literature, although not specifically for East Asia for the reasons cited. Bebchuk (1989 Bebchuk ( , 1999 , using Black and Scholes' original insight that equity is a call option on the firm's assets with an exercise price equal to the debt that is owed, proposed working up the hierarchy of claims. Starting with the most junior claimant (namely, equity), each claimant class is given a choice of either paying off all the more senior claimants in full or having its own claims extinguished. Whichever class pays off all the more senior claimants then becomes the firm's new owner. Bebchuk's proposal respects the absolute priority of the claims and results in an all-equity firm. 7 Bebchuk's proposal allows only existing claimants (shareholders and creditors) to bid. Outsiders may run the firm better, thereby raising its value; so Aghion, Hart and Moore (1992, hereafter AHM) proposed allowing outsiders to both bid and to specify different ways the existing claims would be paid. For example, creditors may propose restructuring the existing debt, while an outside bidder (e.g. a firm in a similar business) may offer to merge and replace debt with equity in the merged entity. Since different classes of claimants would value the bids differently (e.g. senior claimants would tend to prefer offers with a low variance to the returns), AHM propose "homogenizing" the claimants (possibly through Bebchuk's scheme) before the vote on the various offers. While AHM's proposal is more suitable when outsiders could run the firm better, it requires bidders to pay in cash to homogenize bids prior to the vote. 8 This procedure could work in isolated bankruptcies but not in systemic or sector-wide bankruptcies, because potential bidders are often from the same industry and likely face the same predicament. Hotchkiss and Mooradian's (1999) auction between outside buyer and a coalition of incumbent management and creditors also involves cash payments (as well as inefficiencies when insiders "overbid" given their toehold, which can deter some entry of outsiders).
So the market based schemes that have been used in practice and that have been proposed in the literature, ingenious though they are, are unsuited to the East Asian circumstances. Credit markets work poorly especially now: domestic banks are largely bankrupt (governments are restructuring them) and access to foreign credit has been disrupted. With potential domestic bidders cash constrained, large-scale sales to foreigners could generate a backlash of public sentiment, especially in countries with recent and unpleasant colonial experiences. Even if these problems were surmountable, outsiders (whether domestic or foreign) face an acute information asymmetry problem: firms have been remarkably coy about divulging their finances to their own creditors, let alone to unrelated parties even if they were potential bidders. Any proposal relying on outside bidders (as in the AHM proposal) or having junior claimants raise additional cash (as in the Bebchuk proposal) is unlikely to be suitable. A workable proposal must also recognize that existing owners are best placed to operate the firm, and the trick is to overcome the free-riding incentive that diverse creditors face and to get them to reduce their aggregate claims.
The ACCORD Scheme: "Auctions Speak Louder than Words"
This paper develops a non-cash auction based scheme called ACCORD (for Auction based Creditor Ordering by Reducing Debts) in which creditors bid the reduction in the claims they are willing to accept. The ACCORD discourages the standard holdout problem of a creditor free riding on the forgiveness of other creditors by arranging creditors in a queue, with those offering the greatest proportionate reduction placed ahead of the others in the queue, and then having creditors serviced sequentially from the operating cash flows of the firm. Unlike conventional debt re-contracting (e.g. under Chapter 11) where all creditors receive periodic payments (of interest and/or principal), under ACCORD only the creditor at the head of the queue is paid. When this creditor's (reduced) debts are fully discharged, the queue moves up and the creditor who is next in line reaches the head of the queue and is paid, while the others have to wait their turn.
The ACCORD requires creditors to choose between accepting a smaller fraction of his (original) debt but being paid sooner (and therefore with a higher probability of being paid) against waiting longer for a greater payment. A creditor who offers no reduction (or does not bid at all) is placed at the back of the queue, but ahead of the owners (equity-holders) who obtain any residual after all the (reduced) debts are discharged. The firm continues to operate under the existing owner-manager's control.
Under ACCORD, all creditors will remain creditors and the owners will not have their holdings "diluted," but the aggregate level of debt will be lowered. Those that forgive proportionately more have their (reduced) debts fully discharged before those who forgive less. Creditors who believe the firm to be worth little would be willing to forgive a larger proportion of their claim to improve their chances of obtaining at least something before the funds run out. Conversely, creditors who think that the firm's difficulties are only temporary would forgive little, and wait (further behind in line) for their turn to receive payments. The original equity-holders (i.e. the most junior claimants) do not bid and continue to own and operate the firm, obtaining any residual that may be left. We now examine the ACCORD scheme in several settings, focusing on its competitive effect on the creditors and the resulting level of forgiveness.
Example 1 with Endogenous Owner-Manager's Effort Decision
Our first example both illustrates ACCORD's competitive effects on creditor forgiveness and endogenizes the owner-manager's effort decision. We also compare ACCORD to the status quo (i.e. no forgiveness), and to two basic versions of more traditional bankruptcy reorganization schemes, one in which creditors offer forgiveness but there are no changes in the seniority structure and the other in which the creditors swap their debt for equity in the firm. In the example, the financial distress is sufficient that the status quo offers the owner-managers little reason to exert effort, resulting in a low expected value of the firm. So, even though the creditors are owed a large sum and they receive the entire value of the firm, that value is low. The second alternative, which resembles Chapter 11, can generate forgiveness, but each creditor has an incentive to free ride on the forgiveness of the other (which courts try to prevent, but inexperienced or ineffective courts do not). The third alternative of swapping debt for equity eliminates the debt but reduces the original owner-manager's incentive to exert the effort necessary for the firm value to be high. In the example, the ACCORD scheme generates at least as much and perhaps more debt reduction than the first alternative. Despite this greater forgiveness, the expected payment to creditors can be greater because owner-managers have more incentive to increase the value of the firm. The ACCORD also outperforms the debt-for-equity swap. Since the owner-manager in our example realizes the same value in under all four alternatives (i.e. the status quo, Chapter 11, debt-for-equity swap, and the ACCORD), the ACCORD scheme weakly Pareto dominates the other schemes.
We assume a firm with two creditors that are equally senior and holding equal claims. The value of the firm is H with probability p and L otherwise, with H L 0. The probability p is selected by the owner-manager at a personal cost of Ɗ p, where Ɗ is her disutility per unit of probability. Creditors 1 and 2 bid b 1 and b 2 , respectively, which represent the new lower debt levels that each creditor will accept, knowing that the lower bid will receive higher priority. After b 1 and b 2 are selected, the owner-manager solves the following problem:
The first two terms are the expected return to the owner-manager, given a probability p and limited liability of the owner. The third term is the cost to the owner-manager of the probability choice.
L, so that the efficient outcome has the owner-manager select p 1. The optimal solution for the owner-manager is to select p
0. We now consider our three alternatives, starting with the status quo. If the creditors together are owed more than H
ࢤ Ɗ
and if no forgiveness occurs, the owner-manager will select p 0. The resulting payoffs are zero for the owner-manager and L/2 for each creditor.
Next consider the ACCORD scheme. The following proposition reports the subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proposition: In the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, the owner-manager chooses:
The are two cases to consider for the creditors. Case 1:
, with the result that the firm value is H, creditors each receive a payoff of , and the owner-manager's payoff is zero.
Proof: First note that the indicated strategy for the owner-manager is clearly the best response to the levels proposed by the creditors. To consider the creditors, there are two cases.
Case 1:
otherwise. The former follows because the resulting firm value will be H and the creditors can be paid their full (reduced) claims. For the latter case of b 2 HࢤƊ 2 , the firm value will be L and, after creditor 1 as the more senior claimant receives Thus, the efficient outcome is realized in equilibrium, with creditors sharing H ࢤ Ɗ , the maximum firm value minus the amount needed to motivate the owner-manager to choose p 1. The owner-manager's overall payoff is zero.
The next alternative is the first of two more traditional bankruptcy schemes in which the creditors negotiate among themselves to reduce the debt. Our simple model of this procedure has the two creditors report their new debt levels. The firm value is determined, after which the creditors receive their new claims, if there is sufficient value to do so; otherwise the creditors receive the full value of the firm divided in proportion to their new claims. Consider as an equilibrium candidate each creditor demanding H ࢤ Ɗ /2. In this case, the owner-manager will choose p 1, creditors will each receive H ࢤ Ɗ /2, and the owner-manager receives zero. While it is clear that neither creditor wishes to unilaterally reduce its demand, there may be interest in raising one's demand, though. To see this, suppose creditor 1 demands H ࢤ Ɗ 
So, if the following inequality holds:
then the equilibrium candidate is an equilibrium and the payoffs for all participants are precisely those with the ACCORD scheme. If this inequality is violated, which is more likely as D increases, then it can easily be shown that the equilibrium is for no forgiveness by either participant, leading to the owner-manager's choice of p 0 and a firm value of L. Thus, each creditor will receive 0. 5L, which is strictly less than H ࢤ Ɗ
, the creditors share in the pure-strategy equilibria of the ACCORD scheme. The last alternative is for creditors to swap debt for equity in the firm. A simple model of this approach allows the creditors to independently propose fractions of the equity that they require in exchange for the debt. Let i be the fraction demanded by creditor i 1, 2 and assume, given that the creditors are owed equal amounts, that i is restricted to be no more than 0.5. Then the owner-manager will select:
The symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium is for creditor i to select: , the firm value will be L, the creditors will each receive 0. 5L, and the owner-manager receives zero.
Summing up, we have the following results: 1) The status quo leads to a firm value of L, with 0. 5L going to each creditor and zero to the owner-manager.
2) The pure-strategy equilibria of the ACCORD scheme lead to a firm value of H and zero payoff to the owner-manager
, there is a continuum of pure-strategy equilibria in which the creditors share H
, but in all cases each creditor receives at least L.
3) In the equilibrium of the more traditional bankruptcy scheme, the firm value is H and creditors
. Otherwise the firm value is L and each creditor realizes 0. 5L. In either case, there is zero payoff to the owner-manager. 4) In the equilibrium of the debt-for-equity swap, the firm value is H and creditors each realize
. Otherwise the firm value is L and each creditor realizes 0. 5L. In either case, there is zero payoff to the owner-manager.
Thus, ACCORD is the only one of the four schemes considered that generates the efficient outcome for all parameter values (i.e., firm value of H). Furthermore, ACCORD always weakly Pareto dominates the status quo. ACCORD also weakly Pareto dominates the two more traditional bankruptcy schemes for L sufficiently large.
We see that the ACCORD scheme encourages more forgiveness but, at the same time, offers payoffs to the creditors that are never lower and may be higher. In this example, the owner-manager's payoff was always zero.
Example with Firm Value Uncertainty
We now move to an example that has no explicit role for the owner-managers, but which introduces underlying uncertainty about the value of the firm. We show that the creditors may not realize the full value of the firm; instead, the ACCORD scheme offers in equilibrium a positive expected residual return to the owner-manager.
Suppose that the value of the firm could be low ( We analyze ACCORD's equilibrium bidding in this example by considering two situations. In the first, H L 100, so there is no uncertainty, while the second case has H L.
No Uncertainty
The creditors hold a common belief that the true value of the firm is $100 with certainty. 
Uncertainty
We now suppose that H 100 L 0. So, while the expected value of the firm is 100, there is uncertainty about that value. We first argue that b 1 b 2 50 is not an equilibrium. To see this, suppose creditor 1 does bid b 1 50 and compare creditor 2 ߰ s expected return with b 2 50 and with b 2 marginally less than 50. The former bid will mean that 2 is junior creditor with positive probability, leading to a poor return when the true firm value is L. Bidding less than 50, however, guarantees senior status, so a bid sufficiently close to 50 can offer a higher expected return to creditor 2. Thus b 1 b 2 50 is not an equilibrium. No pure strategy equilibrium exists for this example. We now determine the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Define: Figure 3 illustrates the range of bids, b , b , as L varies from 0 to 100. Second, Figure 3 shows that the maximum value of b is 111. 5. Thus, our analysis implicitly assumes that the original face value of the debt owed to each creditor exceeds $111. 50 (because creditors cannot bid more than their original claims). If each creditor is owed less than $111. 50, however, the analysis needs to be slightly modified, but the results are qualitatively the same. Third, for L close to zero (which means H is near 200), bids are in a small range around 100, which is roughly the value of each creditor's claim were it known that the outcome would be H with certainty. Thus, the creditors effectively bid as though they are ignoring the possibility of the L outcome, because its value is so low, and focus on the H outcome. Fourth, as L approaches 100 and the uncertainty is eliminated, we approach the situation in Section 2.2.1 in which both creditors bid 50.
Since the expected value of the firm is ½ L H , absolute priority requires that each creditor receives ¼ L H . However, it can be shown that, for all cases 1 ࢤ 4, each creditor's equilibrium expected return is less than ¼ L H . As a consequence, the owner-manager's equity position has a positive expected value. Figure 4 illustrates the expected value of the equity as L varies from 0 to 100 (and H varies from 200 to 100). Notice that as L increases from 0, the owner-manager's expected return increases. Beyond about L 55, though, this expected return decreases. To understand this reversal, consider the extreme case of L 0 and H 200, for which the variance of the value is highest. In this case, both creditors bid b 100 (i.e., no forgiveness), for an expected return of 100 with probability ½, which leaves zero expected return for the owner-manager. Bidding b 100 is what the creditors would bid if the value of the firm was known to be 200 with certainty. As discussed above, the bidding ignores the event that the firm value is zero, since no value is realized in that event.
Despite the owner-manager's expected residual return, the equilibrium forgiveness is not sufficient to guarantee that the new debt level will be sustainable. This is immediate since, as noted above, b H/2, so it is possible for the new level of debt to exceed even H. Also, Figure 3 shows that b ½L. Thus, equilibrium forgiveness is guaranteed to be insufficient in the event that the realization of the firm value is L. (On the other hand, b ½H, so the new level of debt may be sustainable.) In practice, bankruptcy reorganization cannot guarantee that a firm will not subsequently experience financial distress (just as a firm that has not experienced financial distress in the past cannot guarantee that financial distress will not occur in the future). We discuss this issue at greater length in section 3.
Summary of Examples
The example in Section 2.1 showed that ACCORD not only reduces the standard free rider problem among the creditiors in a bankruptcy reorganization better than other traditional schemes, but it can do so in a manner that leads to an outcome that is Paretor superior to the outcomes of these other schemes. That is, creditors and debtors fare no worse and perhaps better with ACCORD. In this example, creditors had certainty about the value of the firm, at least in equilibrium. The example in Section 2.2 introduced uncertainty and showed how the creditors realized less than the full expected value of the firm, thereby providing the owner-manager more motivation to operate the firm efficiently. While we do not merge the moral hazard of the managers and the uncertainty faced by the creditors, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the conclusions from each example will persist in a joint example. Thus, ACCORD will lead to forgiveness that provides a positive expected payoff to managers net of the disutility of the efforts, leading to a higher firm value and greater likelihood that creditors will receive their claims.
Summary of Results and Additional Considerations with ACCORD
The earlier section showed that the ACCORD scheme results in debt forgiveness and that the owner-manager could expect a positive residual return, which provides the vital incentive to operate the firm efficiently. This result arises from the uncertainty over the value of the firm. We now extend these results in several ways.
Pre-Existing Seniority of Claims
Example 2 is now altered to include junior creditors who have claims in addition to the two (senior) creditors. Since the payoffs to the two senior creditors do not depend on the junior creditors' claims, the optimal bidding strategy of senior creditors (described in Section 2.2.2) would be unchanged. We now examine the junior creditor's bidding strategy.
Let S represent the sum of the senior creditors' bids. As was noted, L ࣘ 2 b ࣘ S and H may exceed S. Consequently, the junior creditors will also face a two-point distribution over the residual value available to them: it is 0 if L is eventual firm value and it is max H ࢤ S, 0 if H is the eventual value. With zero as one of the two points in the distribution, it follows from Section 2. 2. 2 that the junior creditors will bid b ½max H ࢤ S, 0 , which eliminates all positive expected residual returns for the owners. This result is an artifact of the initial two-point distribution, so we now consider a continuous distribution example.
With a pre-existing seniority structure, the nature of the equilibrium bidding is that all senior creditor classes that are certain they will be repaid, will bid no forgiveness. Forgivenss will begin only in the class where there is some probability of not being fully paid, and in that case forgiveness occurs as in Section 2. This bidding will leave a positive expected return to the next most senior claimants, who will bid in a manner that offers a positive expected return to those junior to them, and so on down to the equityholders. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 3: Suppose that it is commonly known by the creditors that the value of the firm, V, is uniformly distributed on 0, 1 . Our analysis considers the two most-senior creditors, who are owed identical amounts that exceed $1 in total. Appendix 2 determines the symmetric equilibrium in which both creditors bid an amount b that they are willing to accept according to the following cumulative distribution function: For a creditor that bids b , the two terms above represent, respectively, a payment of b when the realized value of the firm exceeds and a payment equal to the full value of the firm when that value is less than b . Thus, the creditors together expect a return of 0. 44223, and leave on average 0. 05777 or 11. 55% of the firm value to the more junior claimants.
Since b 0. 2532, a second property of the equilibrium is that the two creditors together are guaranteed to bid more than 0. 5, the expected value of the firm. It can be shown that each creditor bids 0. 3399 on average. With an upper range b 0. 7468, it is immediate that the creditors together may demand more than 1. 0, the highest possible value of the firm. The likelihood of that event is only 1. 38%, though. Thus, with probability 98. 62%, junior claimants receive a positive level of expected residual return.
This pattern of progressively smaller but positive expected returns to the progressively more junior creditors violates absolute priority, but it helps the functioning of ACCORD. In any class, creditors need some expected return as an incentive to compete for a better position in their segment of the queue; otherwise, they have no incentive to forgive, which would adversely affect the outcome of ACCORD. They also need some uncertainty about that return, so that (in equilibrium) they leave some residual expected value to the next lower class. If this violation of absolute priority is a concern, it can be reduced if the courts can determine whether any creditor classes are are low enough relative to the best scenario of the firm so that they are guaranteed to expect nothing according to absolute priority. In this case, the courts may be able to extinguish the creditors' claims up front, with the effect that ACCORD would assure the equityholders an even greater positive expected return.
Creditors with Private Information
Section 2 assumed that the creditors share a common belief about the probability distribution of the value of the firm. In practice, creditors may have different information and may interpret the same information about the firm differently. In this subsection we consider an example with two creditors, each with private information. We show a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which a creditor who is more optimistic about the firm's prospects tends to forgive less and is more likely to become the junior creditor.
Example 4: Suppose that the value of the firm is V V 1 V 2 . Both creditors share a common belief that the random variables V 1 and V 2 are independent, that V 1 takes on the values 0 or 1, each with probability ½, and that V 2 is 0 or 1, each with probability ½. Assume also that creditor j privately observes v j , the realization of V j , j 1, 2. Therefore, creditor j who observes 0 realizes that the firm is worth 0 or 1, both equally likely, and creditor j who observes 1 knows that the firm is worth 1 or 2, both with probability ½.
In the Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium, creditor j who observes v j 0 draws a bid according to the cumulative distribution function:
And creditor j who observes v j 1 draws a bid b according to the cumulative distribution function: The expected bid by a creditor observing 0 is:
and the expected bid by a creditor observing 1 is:
Government-creditor and Noncompetitive Bids
Many East Asian governments now hold (directly or indirectly) substantial claims against financially distressed private firms. The governments have taken over, or substantially control the domestic banks whose non-performing loans far exceed their capital. Banks' claims on private, financially distressed firms (whether residing in the intervened banks, or in bank restructuring agencies, or asset management companies) are substantial. While the government's agent could bid like other creditors, given its size and vulnerability to making politically motivated bids, we suggest that these claims be reduced by the weighted average of the other bids.
9 Such "non-competitive bids" (to use the misleading term from the auction for U.S. Treasury Bills) would avoid politicizing the auction, and may also be permitted for other small creditors who may be at an informational disadvantage.
Implementation and Applicability
Familiarity may breed contempt, but novelty elicits suspicion; and as ACCORD has both familiar and novel elements, it may elicit both. This section turns to how the ACCORD could be implemented. An important point to note is that ACCORD requires no new laws or any existing laws to be changed; it is simply a procedure that courts could oversee if debtors and creditors agree. Existing bankruptcy laws specify the super-majority (say, two-thirds) that is required for creditors before the courts would impose the agreement on dissenting creditors. So, if the firm and creditors with, say, two-thirds of the claims agree to use the ACCORD, the judge should allow its use.
The crucial difference between ACCORD and other market-based schemes proposed in the literature is that it specifically allows existing owners to retain control over the firm's operations, without committing themselves to the speed at which cash is paid to the claimants. Rather than ask, as Bebchuk does in his pioneering proposal, which class of creditors gets to operate the firm, ACCORD assures the owners that they would continue to own and operate the firm and has creditors decide how much they are willing to collect against how long they are willing to wait.
This assurance to the owners makes the ACCORD ideal for East Asia where creditors are ill suited to operate the myriad firms mired in large debts. Governments having major claims further complicates the situation: any official negotiating a reduction in the claim would be vulnerable to coercion by politicians and hobbled by accusations of corruption. Under these circumstances, even honest and competent officials prefer to do nothing, which may be why corporate debt renegotiations are not taking place in East Asia.
The suitability of ACCORD to some situations does not make it a panacea, and there may be few takers if it is offered as a possibility. Clearly, if debtors could get away without paying creditors anything, they would not bother with the ACCORD. Conversely, if creditors are very confident that they will all eventually get paid in full, the ACCORD is no improvement over the status quo. But for a group of firms whose owners can and want to pay, and creditors are willing to accept a "reasonable" amount, and where negotiations are either too complicated or impossible (perhaps because officials cannot agree on the government's claims), ACCORD would be useful. There would certainly be no harm done in offering it as an additional alternative.
It is useful to consider some details of how ACCORD could be implemented. Before the auction is conducted, owners would agree to forgo any cash dividends or payouts for, say, 5 years and creditors would agree that (1) they will not change their minds during these 5 years (e.g. they cannot petition for the firm to be liquidated instead), (2) that they would receive payment only when their claim moves to the head of the queue, and (3) that any cash payment is at the discretion of the firm. The firm could therefore use or accumulate cash without paying any of the deferred creditors; and by having creditors agree to this, it avoids endless disputes over how much cash is really needed to operate the business. Nothing of course prevents a creditor from selling his (diminished) claim to someone else willing to take his place in the creditor queue.
Whenever the debts are fully discharged, the firm is no longer under the court's aegis and is free to operate unfettered. If the (reduced) debts are not fully discharged by the 5 years, the firm is liquidated automatically. (This too could be by auction with the owners and creditors free to bid.) The automatic liquidation clause protects creditors against the firm using the cash surpluses to buy assets (which may have genuine business reasons) instead of servicing the debts of those in the creditor queue. The deferred debts should accrue interest at a specified rate (at least the bank deposit rate or Treasury bill interest rate). 10 Hausch and Ramachandran (2000) describe auction procedures that minimize the likelihood of bidder collusion and corruption of the auctioneer.
While firms may only distribute cash to the head of the creditor queue, they are free to raise additional funds through asset sales, new equity or even new borrowings. Unlike conventional bankruptcy (where post-filing claims are senior to all pre-bankruptcy claims), such new lenders receive no cash payments until all the deferred claims outstanding in the queue are fully discharged. So a new lender or investor would need tremendous confidence in the firm's viability to lend; but since the firm is not obligated to make any cash payments for several years, it could finance its operations without raising new funds. Of course, the firm could also discharge all of its outstanding debts at any time; so the firm could borrow or issue new equity, discharge the outstanding debts with the proceeds, and operate unfettered.
We conclude by mentioning "sovereign bankruptcy" as another situation where ACCORD could be useful. Creditors cannot take over a country's government when it defaults, and must collectively reduce their claims. This is very similar to the situation for which ACCORD was developed. Multilateral trusted institutions like the IMF could utilize the ACCORD in reducing the claims of creditors. Such concepts are still new and undeveloped; but ACCORD may be suitable in some situations.
Endnotes
1 High leverage prior to the crisis is due to at least two factors: 1) debt can be more attractive to lenders given the weak legal protection for noncontrolling shareholders; and 2) controlling owner-managers preferred to maintain their control and minimize disclosure of information (see East Asia: Recovery and Beyond, World Bank, 2000) . 2 The depreciation of local currencies relative to the US dollar between the end of 1996 and October 2001 was 76 percent for Indonesia, 35 percent for South Korea, 33 percent for Malaysia, 49 percent for the Philippines, and 43 percent for Thailand.
3 Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and South Korea all had periods between June 1997 and January 1998 when interest rates were at least 25 per cent (Barro, 2001) . 4 For Indonesia in 2000, at least 75 percent of the total debt of private enterprises of $110 billion is denominated in foreign currency (see IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/132, October 2000) . 5 For comparison's sake, the average debt-to-equity ratio for the manufacturing sector in the United States in 1998 was 1.59.
6 See IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/132, October 2000. 7 The firm could introduce debt through a separate transaction that occurs simultaneously if all the claimants in that class agree to accept pro rata fractions of each class of liabilities in the desired new financial structure. 8 Hart, La Porta Drago, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Moore (1997) offer a variation on AHM that accommodates cash-constrained claimants, but does not typically eliminate the need for cash payments altogether.
9 It could also be that the government's claims and queue positions are assigned to match the proportionate reductions and queue positions of the other creditors. Thus, rather than the government's claims appearing as a bulge in the middle of the queue, its claims could be uniformly spread over the queue.
10 If the debts do not accrue interest, the firm will not be motivated to pay its creditors until the end of the five years, at which time either all claims would be paid at once or the firm would be liquidated. Anticipating this delay in payment, creditors would tend to forgive less (although not less in a present value sense). A positive interest rate is necessary to reduce the incentives to hold cash, with the riskless rate a lower bound on the appropriate rate. If the debtor and creditors have different timings of taxes, that can also influence the payment schedule. 
APPENDIX 1: Equilibrium of Example 2
There are four cases to consider in determining the ACCORD equilibrium of Example 2. The proofs for the four cases are similar, though, so we consider only case 1 here.
Suppose creditor 
The first term deals with the event that creditor 1 bids less than creditor 2, becomes senior creditor, and is paid b whether the firm value is L or H. The second and third terms treat the event that creditor bids more than creditor 2, and so becomes the junior creditor. In the second term, the value is L, so there is only L ࢤ b 2 available to creditor 1. In the third term, the value is H, which is sufficient to fully pay the junior creditor. Integrating by parts gives: This analysis has assumed that b L, which do hold for L L ࢩ . We have shown that, for case 1 and against creditor 2 using G , creditor 1 cannot do better than to choose any bid on b , b . The three other cases are similar. Thus, G is a best response for creditor 1, which means that it is an equilibrium for both creditors to use G .
APPENDIX 2: Equilibrium of Example 3
Recall that V ß U 0, 1 . We will determine a symmetric mixed-strategy bidding equilibrium for the creditors. A creditor will reduce its debt down to between 0.2532 and 0.7468.
